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In	  ‘Epistemicism	  and	  modality’,	  Juhani	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri	  rigorously	  treats	  the	  problem	  of	  
developing	  a	  model-­‐theoretic	  semantics	  for	  a	  formal	  language	  with	  the	  operators	  
‘necessarily’	  and	  ‘actually’,	  interpreted	  in	  terms	  of	  metaphysical	  modality,	  and	  an	  operator	  
‘definitely’,	  interpreted	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  epistemicist	  theory	  of	  vagueness	  developed	  in	  my	  
book	  (Williamson	  1994).	  The	  challenge	  is	  especially	  pertinent	  because	  my	  epistemicist	  
account	  of	  definiteness	  has	  a	  modal	  dimension,	  whose	  interaction	  with	  other	  forms	  of	  
modal	  variation	  raises	  delicate	  issues	  for	  the	  overall	  theory.	  
	  
	  
1. Worldly	  differences	  and	  semantic	  differences	  
	  
According	  to	  epistemicism,	  vagueness	  in	  a	  language	  induces	  no	  deviation	  from	  classical	  logic	  
or	  from	  bivalent	  semantics.	  It	  is	  a	  purely	  epistemic	  phenomenon:	  borderline	  cases	  are	  just	  
cases	  of	  unavoidable	  ignorance	  for	  a	  special	  sort	  of	  reason.	  The	  actual	  meaning	  of	  a	  vague	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expression	  differs	  from	  some	  of	  its	  potential	  alternative	  meanings	  in	  ways	  indiscriminable	  
by	  native	  speakers	  of	  the	  language.	  Following	  John	  Hawthorne,	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri	  calls	  this	  idea	  
‘Semantic	  Plasticity’.	  The	  upshot	  is	  a	  special	  obstacle	  to	  knowing	  some	  truths	  expressed	  
using	  the	  vague	  expression.	  Very	  roughly,	  the	  definite	  truths	  are	  those	  knowledge	  of	  which	  
is	  not	  blocked	  by	  an	  obstacle	  of	  that	  sort.	  I	  developed	  the	  underlying	  epistemology	  in	  safety-­‐
theoretic	  terms.	  Knowledge	  requires	  safety	  from	  error:	  one	  knows	  in	  a	  given	  case	  only	  if	  it	  is	  
not	  relevantly	  close	  to	  an	  error	  possibility.	  Actuality	  is	  never	  close	  in	  that	  sense	  to	  
metaphysical	  impossibilities,	  because	  they	  present	  no	  real	  danger.	  	  
Compare	  a	  case	  where	  one	  assents	  to	  a	  true	  proposition	  expressed	  by	  a	  vague	  
sentence	  with	  a	  similar	  case	  where	  one	  assents	  to	  a	  false	  proposition	  expressed	  by	  the	  same	  
sentence.1	  The	  difference	  in	  truth-­‐value	  may	  result	  from	  either	  one	  of	  two	  kinds	  of	  
difference	  between	  the	  cases	  (perhaps	  from	  both).	  The	  first	  kind	  of	  difference	  is	  worldly.	  
The	  vague	  sentence	  may	  express	  the	  same	  proposition	  in	  the	  two	  cases,	  while	  the	  objects	  
under	  discussion	  vary	  in	  their	  properties	  or	  relations.	  For	  instance,	  in	  both	  cases	  the	  
sentence	  ‘Jack	  is	  bald’	  expresses	  the	  proposition	  that	  Jack	  is	  bald,	  but	  Jack	  has	  less	  hair	  in	  
one	  case	  than	  in	  the	  other.	  Thus	  the	  sentence	  ‘Jack	  is	  bald’	  may	  express	  a	  true	  proposition	  
in	  the	  former	  case	  and	  a	  false	  proposition	  in	  the	  latter.	  The	  second	  kind	  of	  difference	  
between	  cases	  is	  semantic.	  Even	  if	  the	  objects	  under	  discussion	  have	  the	  same	  properties	  
and	  relations	  in	  the	  two	  cases,	  the	  sentence	  ‘Jack	  is	  bald’	  may	  express	  different	  
propositions,	  because	  it	  is	  used	  in	  very	  slightly	  different	  ways.	  For	  instance,	  in	  one	  case	  the	  
sentence	  ‘Jack	  is	  bald’	  still	  expresses	  the	  proposition	  that	  Jack	  is	  bald,	  while	  in	  the	  other	  it	  
expresses	  the	  distinct	  proposition	  that	  Jack	  is	  bald*,	  	  where	  the	  standard	  for	  being	  bald*	  is	  
slightly	  more	  demanding	  than	  the	  standard	  for	  being	  bald.	  Thus,	  even	  though	  the	  state	  of	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Jack’s	  scalp	  is	  exactly	  the	  same	  between	  the	  two	  cases,	  the	  sentence	  ‘Jack	  is	  bald’	  may	  again	  
express	  a	  true	  proposition	  in	  the	  former	  case	  and	  a	  false	  proposition	  in	  the	  latter.	  Of	  course,	  
two	  cases	  may	  also	  differ	  in	  both	  worldly	  and	  semantic	  respects	  simultaneously,	  and	  in	  
other	  respects	  too.	  
Concerning	  our	  ignorance	  in	  paradigmatic	  borderline	  cases,	  I	  proposed	  that	  the	  error	  
possibilities	  by	  which	  vagueness	  blocks	  knowledge	  are	  the	  close	  ones	  differing	  from	  the	  
given	  case	  in	  semantic	  but	  not	  in	  worldly	  respects	  (1994,	  p.	  231).	  By	  contrast,	  most	  
discussions	  of	  safety	  in	  epistemology	  concern	  worldly	  but	  not	  semantic	  differences;	  the	  
proposition	  at	  issue	  is	  held	  fixed	  across	  the	  cases	  under	  discussion.	  However,	  if	  one	  wants	  a	  
non-­‐trivial	  safety	  condition	  for	  knowledge	  of	  necessary	  truths,	  as	  in	  mathematics,	  one	  must	  
look	  at	  semantic	  rather	  than	  worldly	  differences:	  if	  a	  sentence	  expresses	  a	  necessary	  truth	  
in	  a	  given	  case,	  then	  it	  expresses	  a	  truth	  in	  all	  cases	  differing	  from	  the	  former	  only	  in	  worldly	  
respects	  (assuming	  that	  all	  cases,	  or	  at	  least	  all	  close	  cases,	  are	  metaphysically	  possible).	  
Thus	  there	  are	  reasons	  independent	  of	  vagueness	  for	  using	  a	  safety	  condition	  that	  takes	  
account	  of	  cases	  that	  differ	  in	  semantic	  respects,	  as	  well	  as	  of	  those	  that	  differ	  only	  in	  
worldly	  ones	  (Williamson	  2000,	  pp.	  181-­‐2).	  However,	  the	  semantic	  differences	  relevant	  to	  
mathematical	  knowledge	  will	  typically	  be	  much	  larger	  than	  those	  relevant	  to	  vagueness;	  the	  
cases	  will	  not	  be	  semantically	  indiscriminable	  to	  native	  speakers.	  
For	  straightforward	  examples,	  we	  can	  treat	  the	  worldly	  and	  semantic	  dimensions	  as	  
mutually	  orthogonal:	  we	  can	  vary	  a	  case	  on	  either	  dimension	  while	  holding	  it	  fixed	  on	  the	  
other.	  For	  more	  complex	  examples,	  however,	  the	  independence	  assumption	  breaks	  down:	  
varying	  a	  case	  on	  one	  dimension	  entails	  varying	  it	  on	  the	  other	  too.	  For	  instance,	  a	  vague	  
word	  may	  be	  both	  used	  and	  mentioned	  in	  the	  same	  sentence,	  as	  in	  disquotational	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biconditionals	  for	  truth	  such	  as	  ‘”Jack	  is	  bald”	  is	  true	  if	  and	  only	  if	  Jack	  is	  bald’,	  a	  type	  of	  
example	  much	  discussed	  in	  the	  recent	  literature	  on	  vagueness	  and	  featured	  in	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri’s	  
paper.	  A	  difference	  between	  cases	  in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘bald’	  is	  semantic	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  
right-­‐hand	  side	  of	  the	  biconditional	  (‘Jack	  is	  bald’)	  but	  worldly	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  left-­‐hand	  
side	  (‘”Jack	  is	  bald”	  is	  true’),	  since	  the	  latter	  is	  about	  a	  broadly	  semantic	  feature	  of	  the	  
former.	  	  
It	  is	  often	  unclear	  how	  to	  apply	  the	  rough	  dichotomy	  between	  the	  world	  and	  our	  
descriptions	  of	  it	  to	  examples	  where	  we	  cannot	  ignore	  the	  fact	  that	  our	  descriptions	  are	  part	  
of	  the	  world.	  Similarly,	  it	  is	  often	  unclear	  how	  to	  apply	  the	  rough	  dichotomy	  between	  the	  
world	  and	  our	  knowledge	  of	  it	  to	  examples	  where	  we	  cannot	  ignore	  the	  fact	  that	  our	  
knowledge	  is	  part	  of	  the	  world,	  as	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  paradox	  of	  knowabilty	  (we	  cannot	  know	  a	  
conjunction	  of	  the	  form:	  P	  and	  it	  will	  never	  be	  known	  that	  P;	  see	  Williamson	  2000,	  pp.	  270-­‐
301).	  Yet	  any	  theory	  of	  vagueness	  must	  be	  applicable	  to	  such	  complex	  examples.	  Problems	  
of	  vagueness	  in	  the	  law	  remind	  us	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  clear	  cases	  and	  borderline	  
cases	  arises	  in	  practice	  for	  arbitrarily	  complex	  sentences.	  One	  benefit	  of	  trying	  to	  construct	  
an	  adequate	  model	  theory	  for	  a	  formal	  language	  with	  a	  ‘definitely’	  operator	  is	  that	  it	  forces	  
us	  to	  think	  systematically	  and	  quite	  generally	  about	  how	  to	  apply	  vagueness-­‐theoretic	  
distinctions	  to	  such	  sentences.	  
At	  this	  point,	  some	  philosophers	  will	  be	  inclined	  to	  scrap	  the	  account	  of	  definiteness	  
based	  on	  the	  worldly-­‐semantic	  distinction	  as	  insufficiently	  general,	  and	  start	  again	  from	  
scratch.	  But	  that	  is	  just	  the	  sort	  of	  methodological	  impatience	  that	  so	  much	  impedes	  
progress	  in	  philosophy.	  In	  particular,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  worldly	  and	  semantic	  dimensions	  are	  
not	  fully	  independent	  of	  each	  other	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  an	  initial	  assumption	  of	  their	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independence	  makes	  a	  bad	  starting-­‐point.	  After	  all,	  if	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  understand	  a	  
phenomenon	  in	  natural	  science,	  we	  may	  initially	  make	  the	  simplifying	  assumption	  that	  two	  
aspects	  of	  it	  are	  mutually	  independent,	  even	  though	  we	  know	  that	  the	  assumption	  is	  not	  
strictly	  correct.	  For	  instance,	  we	  may	  treat	  propositions	  about	  the	  shape	  of	  an	  object	  as	  
probabilistically	  independent	  of	  propositions	  about	  its	  colour,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  calculate	  the	  
probability	  of	  the	  conjunction	  of	  a	  shape	  proposition	  and	  a	  colour	  proposition	  as	  simply	  the	  
product	  of	  the	  probabilities	  of	  the	  conjuncts.	  We	  can	  then	  use	  the	  results	  obtained	  under	  
that	  simplifying	  assumption	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  a	  more	  general	  account	  that	  allows	  for	  
the	  interdependence	  of	  the	  two	  dimensions.	  The	  same	  goes	  for	  the	  treatment	  of	  the	  
worldly	  and	  semantic	  dimensions	  as	  mutually	  independent	  in	  the	  initial	  explanation	  of	  
ignorance	  in	  borderline	  cases.	  Rather	  than	  scrapping	  the	  first	  pass	  explanation,	  we	  may	  do	  
better	  by	  refining	  it.	  A	  specific	  reason	  for	  optimism	  is	  that	  vagueness	  in	  complex	  expressions	  
derives	  somehow	  from	  vagueness	  in	  their	  atomic	  constituents	  and	  modes	  of	  composition.	  
The	  worldly-­‐semantic	  dichotomy	  works	  best	  for	  atomic	  expressions,	  although	  doubtless	  not	  
perfectly	  even	  there.	  
A	  further	  consideration	  comes	  from	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  ‘definitely’	  operator.	  Its	  
treatment	  as	  a	  sentence	  operator	  in	  a	  formal	  language	  with	  a	  compositional	  semantics	  turns	  
out	  to	  involve	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  idealization.	  Within	  limits,	  the	  theorist	  has	  discretion	  to	  
decide	  what	  idealizations	  of	  its	  meaning	  will	  conduce	  to	  the	  most	  illuminating	  logic	  of	  
vagueness.	  
‘Definitely’	  is	  not	  just	  a	  philosopher’s	  invention.	  To	  describe	  someone	  as	  ‘neither	  
definitely	  tall	  nor	  definitely	  not	  tall’	  is	  quite	  intelligible	  in	  ordinary	  English,	  even	  if	  it	  sounds	  a	  
bit	  pedantic.	  Although	  the	  complement	  of	  ‘definitely’	  in	  English	  is	  normally	  an	  adjectival	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phrase	  rather	  than	  a	  sentence,	  that	  goes	  for	  modal	  words	  such	  as	  ‘necessarily’	  and	  ‘possibly’	  
too;	  it	  does	  not	  prevent	  them	  from	  being	  most	  usefully	  formalized	  by	  operators	  on	  
sentences.	  Many	  ordinary	  uses	  of	  ‘definitely’	  are	  epistemic	  in	  a	  way	  not	  specifically	  related	  
to	  vagueness.	  For	  instance,	  a	  detective	  asking	  ‘Who	  was	  definitely	  in	  the	  building	  last	  night?’	  
probably	  means	  something	  like	  ‘Who	  is	  known	  to	  have	  been	  in	  the	  building	  last	  night?’;	  	  
borderline	  cases	  of	  being	  in	  the	  building	  last	  night	  are	  probably	  not	  at	  issue.	  Still,	  theorists	  of	  
vagueness	  can	  legitimately	  requisition	  the	  word	  ‘definitely’	  for	  their	  more	  specific	  purposes.	  
So	  far,	  so	  good.	  
	  
	  
2. Use	  and	  mention	  
	  
A	  more	  pressing	  concern	  is	  that	  the	  formalization	  of	  ‘definitely’	  as	  a	  sentence	  operator	  Δ	  
tailored	  to	  suit	  the	  theory	  of	  vagueness	  may	  not	  fit	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  compositional	  
semantics.	  To	  start	  simple,	  consider	  a	  semantic	  theory	  that	  assigns	  a	  set	  of	  (metaphysically)	  
possible	  worlds	  as	  the	  semantic	  value	  of	  a	  sentence.	  The	  compositional	  semantics	  makes	  
the	  semantic	  value	  of	  the	  sentence	  operator	  Δ	  a	  function	  from	  sets	  of	  possible	  worlds	  to	  
sets	  of	  possible	  worlds.	  Let	  ‘small’	  be	  a	  vague	  predicate	  of	  natural	  numbers	  whose	  
application	  to	  them	  is	  nevertheless	  non-­‐contingent.	  Thus,	  we	  may	  suppose,	  17	  is	  a	  
borderline	  case	  for	  ‘small’;	  it	  is	  vague	  whether	  17	  is	  small,	  but	  not	  contingent	  whether	  17	  is	  
small.	  If	  17	  is	  small,	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  17	  is	  small;	  if	  17	  is	  not	  small,	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  17	  is	  
not	  small.	  Consequently,	  the	  semantic	  value	  of	  ’17	  is	  small’	  is	  either	  the	  set	  of	  all	  worlds	  or	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the	  set	  of	  all	  worlds.	  In	  the	  former	  case,	  ’17	  is	  small’	  has	  the	  same	  semantic	  value	  as	  ‘0	  =	  0’,	  
so	  by	  the	  compositional	  semantics	  ‘Δ(17	  is	  small)’	  has	  the	  same	  semantic	  value	  as	  ‘Δ(0	  =	  0)’,	  
and	  so	  is	  true	  (definitely	  0	  is	  self-­‐identical).	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  the	  semantic	  value	  of	  ’¬(17	  is	  
small)’	  is	  the	  set	  of	  all	  worlds	  and	  so	  the	  same	  as	  the	  semantic	  value	  of	  ‘0	  =	  0’,	  so	  by	  the	  
compositional	  semantics	  ‘Δ¬(17	  is	  small)’	  has	  the	  same	  semantic	  value	  as	  ‘Δ(0	  =0)’,	  and	  so	  is	  
true.	  Either	  way,	  the	  disjunction	  ‘Δ(17	  is	  small)	  ∨ 	  Δ¬(17	  is	  small)’	  is	  true:	  it	  is	  definite	  
whether	  17	  is	  small.	  But	  that	  contradicts	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  it	  is	  vague	  whether	  17	  is	  small.	  
One	  might	  simply	  draw	  the	  moral	  that	  sets	  of	  possible	  worlds	  are	  too	  coarse-­‐grained	  
to	  serve	  as	  the	  semantic	  values	  of	  sentences	  in	  the	  semantics	  for	  a	  logic	  of	  vagueness	  and	  
modality.	  That	  is	  hardly	  surprising.	  The	  envisaged	  semantics	  is	  one-­‐dimensional,	  whereas	  Yli-­‐
Vakkuri	  argues	  powerfully	  that	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  three-­‐dimensional	  rather	  than	  two-­‐
dimensional,	  to	  accommodate	  both	  the	  usual	  two	  modal	  dimensions	  for	  the	  operators	  
‘necessarily’	  and	  ‘actually’	  and	  a	  further	  dimension	  for	  the	  operator	  ‘definitely’.	  But	  further	  
reflection	  suggests	  that	  the	  problem	  goes	  even	  deeper.	  Any	  compositional	  semantics	  for	  Δ	  
makes	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  sentence	  Δφ	  a	  function	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  sentence	  φ,	  in	  
some	  appropriate	  sense	  of	  ‘meaning’.	  Thus	  if	  φ	  is	  synonymous	  with	  ψ	  (they	  have	  the	  same	  
meaning	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense),	  then	  Δφ	  is	  synonymous	  with	  Δψ,	  and	  moreover	  ¬φ	  is	  
synonymous	  with	  ¬ψ,	  so	  Δ¬φ	  is	  synonymous	  with	  Δ¬ψ;	  thus	  φ	  and	  ψ	  have	  the	  same	  
borderline	  cases.	  But	  is	  that	  principle	  defensible?	  
To	  see	  the	  difficulty,	  let	  us	  make	  the	  standard	  assumption	  that	  the	  natural	  kind	  
terms	  ‘furze’	  and	  ‘gorse’	  are	  synonymous.	  They	  are	  also	  presumably	  not	  perfectly	  precise:	  
for	  instance,	  it	  is	  slightly	  vague	  when	  furze	  and	  gorse	  first	  evolved.	  Nevertheless,	  for	  
purposes	  of	  meaning,	  the	  two	  words	  are	  vague	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  Let	  φ	  be	  the	  sentence	  ‘All	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and	  only	  furze	  is	  furze’	  and	  ψ	  the	  sentence	  ‘All	  and	  only	  furze	  is	  gorse’.	  On	  a	  standard	  
compositional	  semantics,	  φ	  and	  ψ	  have	  the	  same	  semantic	  structure	  and	  synonymous	  
corresponding	  constituents,	  and	  so	  are	  synonymous.	  Thus,	  by	  hypothesis,	  Δφ	  and	  Δψ	  are	  
synonymous	  too.	  Since	  φ	  is	  a	  trivial	  logical	  truth,	  Δφ	  is	  true.	  Hence	  Δψ	  is	  true	  too.	  But	  is	  it?	  
We	  may	  assume	  that	  ‘furze’	  and	  ‘gorse’	  are	  understood	  independently	  of	  each	  other;	  a	  
speaker	  may	  understand	  either	  word	  without	  understanding	  the	  other.	  No	  special	  rule	  co-­‐
ordinates	  them;	  they	  just	  happen	  to	  have	  the	  same	  meaning.	  Although	  the	  use	  of	  ‘furze’	  
happens	  exactly	  to	  match	  the	  use	  of	  ‘gorse’,	  there	  could	  very	  easily	  have	  been	  a	  slight	  
mismatch,	  where	  the	  use	  of	  one	  word	  was	  slightly	  more	  liberal	  than	  the	  use	  of	  the	  other,	  so	  
that	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  former	  included	  slightly	  earlier	  samples	  than	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  
latter	  did.	  The	  vagueness	  of	  ‘furze’	  and	  ‘gorse’	  makes	  it	  unclear	  to	  native	  speakers	  whether	  
there	  is	  indeed	  such	  a	  slight	  difference	  in	  extension.	  Thus	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  definite	  that	  all	  and	  
only	  furze	  is	  furze,	  but	  not	  definite	  that	  all	  and	  only	  furze	  is	  gorse.	  On	  this	  view,	  φ	  and	  ψ	  are	  
synonymous,	  but	  Δφ	  and	  Δψ	  differ	  in	  truth-­‐value	  and	  so	  in	  meaning.	  If	  so,	  the	  operator	  Δ	  
does	  not	  have	  a	  compositional	  semantics.	  
Could	  a	  theorist	  respond	  by	  individuating	  meanings	  in	  a	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  way?	  We	  
may	  assume	  that	  the	  only	  relevant	  difference	  between	  ‘furze’	  and	  ‘gorse’	  is	  the	  syntactic	  
difference	  between	  the	  words	  themselves.	  A	  way	  of	  individuating	  meanings	  on	  which	  ‘furze’	  
and	  ‘gorse’	  differ	  in	  meaning	  makes	  synonymy	  between	  distinct	  words	  virtually	  impossible.	  
A	  supervaluationist	  might	  implement	  such	  a	  fine-­‐grained	  standard	  by	  identifying	  meanings	  
with	  functions	  from	  admissible	  sharpenings	  of	  the	  language	  to	  Kaplanian	  characters.	  
Suppose	  that	  one	  admissible	  sharpening	  assigns	  the	  character	  C	  to	  both	  ‘furze’	  and	  ‘gorse’,	  
while	  another	  assigns	  a	  distinct	  character	  C*	  to	  both	  words.	  Then	  if	  a	  third	  admissible	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sharpening	  assigns	  C	  to	  ‘furze’	  and	  C*	  to	  ‘gorse’,	  while	  a	  fourth	  assigns	  C*	  to	  ‘furze’	  and	  C	  to	  
‘gorse’,	  the	  account	  makes	  ‘furze’	  and	  ‘gorse’	  differ	  in	  meaning,	  even	  if	  the	  overall	  range	  of	  
admissible	  sharpenings	  associates	  each	  of	  them	  with	  exactly	  the	  same	  range	  of	  characters.	  
The	  trivialization	  of	  synonymy	  is	  a	  high	  price	  to	  pay	  for	  such	  a	  view,	  especially	  since	  it	  
threatens	  to	  trivialize	  the	  requirement	  of	  compositionality	  too.	  
An	  alternative	  way	  of	  interpreting	  the	  semantics	  is	  to	  retain	  a	  conception	  of	  meaning	  
that	  allows	  ‘furze’	  and	  ‘gorse’	  to	  be	  synonymous,	  but	  to	  treat	  the	  Δ	  operator	  as	  tacitly	  
quotational:	  Δφ	  is	  really	  about	  the	  sentence	  φ	  itself,	  at	  least	  partly	  (a	  move	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri	  may	  
accept).	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  so-­‐called	  compositional	  semantics	  for	  the	  language	  is	  not	  what	  it	  
seems,	  since	  it	  does	  not	  determine	  the	  meanings	  of	  complex	  expressions	  just	  from	  the	  
meanings	  of	  their	  constituents	  and	  the	  way	  those	  constituents	  are	  put	  together.	  For	  a	  
genuinely	  compositional	  semantics,	  one	  might	  have	  to	  make	  the	  quotation	  explicit	  —	  and	  
supply	  a	  semantics	  of	  quotation.	  
These	  problems	  are	  reminiscent	  of	  those	  facing	  attempts	  to	  give	  a	  compositional	  
semantics	  of	  variable-­‐binding,	  on	  which	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri	  has	  written	  illuminatingly	  elsewhere	  
(2013).	  In	  the	  simple	  case	  of	  an	  extensional,	  non-­‐indexical	  language,	  if	  one	  identifies	  the	  
meaning	  of	  a	  singular	  term	  with	  a	  function	  that	  maps	  each	  assignment	  of	  values	  to	  variables	  
to	  the	  denotation	  of	  the	  term	  on	  that	  assignment,	  the	  variables	  ‘x’	  and	  ‘y’	  count	  as	  different	  
in	  meaning,	  simply	  because	  they	  have	  distinct	  values	  on	  at	  least	  one	  assignment,	  even	  
though	  that	  is	  just	  a	  corollary	  of	  their	  syntactic	  difference.	  In	  one	  respect,	  however,	  the	  




Similar	  problems	  arise	  anyway	  for	  epistemic	  operators,	  and	  so	  pose	  no	  threat	  to	  the	  
epistemicist	  view	  that	  Δ	  is	  an	  epistemic	  operator.	  For	  instance,	  even	  though	  ‘furze’	  and	  
‘gorse’	  are	  synonymous,	  it	  may	  be	  natural	  to	  describe	  someone	  as	  knowing	  that	  something	  
is	  furze	  without	  knowing	  that	  it	  is	  gorse,	  or	  as	  knowing	  that	  all	  and	  only	  furze	  is	  furze	  
without	  knowing	  that	  all	  and	  only	  furze	  is	  gorse.	  If	  one	  is	  doing	  the	  semantics	  of	  ‘know’	  in	  
terms	  of	  epistemically	  possible	  worlds,	  one	  may	  then	  be	  driven	  to	  assign	  ‘furze’	  and	  ‘gorse’	  
distinct	  intensions	  (here,	  functions	  from	  epistemically	  possible	  worlds	  to	  extensions),	  even	  
though	  they	  are	  synonymous.	  
Of	  course,	  one	  may	  take	  a	  more	  coarse-­‐grained	  view	  of	  knowledge	  and	  simply	  tough	  
it	  out,	  insisting	  that	  to	  know	  that	  all	  and	  only	  furze	  is	  furze	  just	  is	  to	  know	  that	  all	  and	  only	  
furze	  is	  gorse,	  even	  if	  those	  who	  recognize	  that	  truth	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  the	  sentence	  ‘All	  
and	  only	  furze	  is	  furze’	  cannot	  recognize	  it	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  the	  sentence	  ‘All	  and	  only	  
furze	  is	  gorse’.	  In	  principle,	  someone	  might	  take	  the	  same	  line	  with	  vagueness	  and	  simply	  
tough	  it	  out,	  insisting	  that	  for	  it	  to	  be	  definite	  that	  all	  and	  only	  furze	  is	  furze	  just	  is	  for	  it	  to	  
be	  definite	  that	  all	  and	  only	  furze	  is	  gorse,	  even	  if	  those	  who	  recognize	  that	  truth	  under	  the	  
guise	  of	  the	  former	  sentence	  cannot	  recognize	  it	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  the	  latter.	  However,	  the	  
tough	  line	  is	  better	  motivated	  for	  ‘know’	  than	  for	  ‘definite’.	  When	  we	  speak	  of	  knowledge	  
and	  ignorance,	  we	  often	  wish	  to	  prescind	  from	  the	  words	  in	  which	  a	  given	  piece	  of	  
knowledge	  might	  be	  expressed.	  By	  contrast,	  when	  we	  speak	  of	  definiteness	  and	  vagueness,	  
the	  expression	  in	  given	  words	  is	  typically	  central	  to	  our	  interest.	  To	  prescind	  from	  it	  would	  
be	  to	  miss	  the	  very	  point	  at	  issue.	  
These	  questions	  also	  arise	  for	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri’s	  preferred	  epistemic	  interpretation	  of	  his	  
three-­‐dimensional	  semantics.	  To	  make	  all	  the	  desired	  distinctions,	  an	  intended	  model	  will	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have	  to	  assign	  distinct	  3D	  profiles	  to	  sentences	  that,	  by	  a	  natural	  compositional	  standard,	  
are	  synonymous.	  That	  is	  very	  far	  from	  making	  the	  theory	  useless:	  it	  can	  still	  serve	  as	  a	  good	  
guide	  to	  reasoning	  about	  the	  interaction	  between	  vagueness	  and	  metaphysical	  modality.	  
But	  it	  will	  not	  be	  a	  compositional	  semantics	  in	  the	  sense	  one	  might	  originally	  have	  expected.	  	  
To	  the	  two	  non-­‐epistemically	  modal	  dimensions	  needed	  for	  a	  standard	  semantic	  
treatment	  of	  ‘necessarily’	  and	  ‘actually’,	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri	  adds	  a	  third	  modal	  dimension	  for	  the	  
treatment	  of	  ‘definitely’,	  with	  promising	  results.3	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  third	  dimension	  is	  best	  
understood	  as	  epistemically	  modal.	  Since	  he	  is	  implementing	  an	  epistemicist	  account	  of	  
vagueness,	  that	  is	  not	  altogether	  surprising.	  He	  requires	  the	  epistemic	  dimension	  to	  include	  
metaphysically	  impossible	  epistemic	  possibilities	  as	  well	  as	  metaphysically	  possible	  ones.	  On	  
his	  interpretation,	  ‘when	  φ	  is	  borderline,	  φ	  expresses	  in	  the	  actual	  world,	  according	  to	  some	  
close	  epistemic	  possibility,	  a	  proposition	  other	  than	  the	  one	  it	  actually	  expresses	  in	  the	  
actual	  world’,	  but	  ‘any	  such	  epistemic	  possibility	  will	  be	  metaphysically	  impossible,	  because	  
it	  is	  a	  noncontingent	  matter	  which	  proposition	  is	  actually	  expressed	  by	  a	  sentence’.	  Such	  a	  
use	  of	  metaphysically	  impossible	  worlds	  in	  the	  semantics	  for	  ‘definitely’	  poses	  an	  apparent	  
threat	  to	  epistemicist	  theories	  that	  explain	  actual	  borderline	  cases	  in	  terms	  of	  Semantic	  
Plasticity,	  for	  surely	  no	  metaphysically	  impossible	  world	  is	  close	  in	  the	  safety-­‐relevant	  sense	  
to	  the	  actual	  world.	  
However,	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  reconcile	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri’s	  semantics	  with	  the	  safety-­‐
theoretic	  considerations	  by	  elucidating	  its	  explanatory	  ambitions.	  For	  just	  as	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  
meaning	  of	  the	  word	  ‘light’	  is	  not	  tasked	  with	  explaining	  the	  underlying	  nature	  of	  light,	  and	  
a	  theory	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  ‘knowledge’	  is	  not	  tasked	  with	  explaining	  the	  
underlying	  nature	  of	  knowledge,	  so	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  ‘indefinite’	  is	  not	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tasked	  with	  explaining	  the	  underlying	  nature	  of	  indefiniteness.	  	  The	  point	  is	  easier	  to	  miss	  in	  
the	  latter	  case,	  for	  while	  semantics	  is	  obviously	  separate	  from	  physics,	  and	  only	  slightly	  less	  
obviously	  separate	  from	  epistemology,	  it	  is	  not	  at	  all	  obviously	  separate	  from	  the	  theory	  of	  
indefiniteness	  as	  a	  linguistic	  phenomenon.	  A	  comprehensive	  book	  on	  semantics	  should	  say	  
something	  about	  vagueness	  and	  indefiniteness.	  Nevertheless,	  that	  task	  must	  be	  
distinguished	  from	  the	  task	  of	  giving	  the	  semantics	  of	  the	  word	  ‘indefinite’,	  just	  as	  the	  task	  
of	  explaining	  the	  underlying	  nature	  of	  meaning	  must	  be	  distinguished	  from	  the	  task	  of	  giving	  
the	  semantics	  of	  the	  word	  ‘meaning’.	  Thus,	  even	  if	  safety-­‐theoretic	  considerations	  are	  
central	  to	  the	  underlying	  nature	  of	  indefiniteness,	  they	  need	  not	  figure	  in	  a	  good	  semantic	  
account	  of	  the	  word	  ‘indefinite’	  or	  the	  Δ	  operator,	  just	  as,	  even	  if	  safety-­‐theoretic	  
considerations	  are	  central	  to	  the	  underlying	  nature	  of	  knowledge,	  they	  need	  not	  figure	  in	  a	  
good	  semantic	  account	  of	  the	  word	  ‘knowledge’.	  By	  itself,	  the	  appeal	  to	  merely	  
epistemically	  possible	  worlds	  in	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri’s	  semantics	  for	  Δ	  poses	  no	  threat	  to	  a	  safety-­‐
theoretic	  account	  of	  the	  underlying	  nature	  of	  indefiniteness,	  since	  the	  semantics	  is	  not	  
expected	  to	  describe	  that	  underlying	  level.	  Of	  course,	  if	  for	  some	  sentences	  in	  some	  
contexts	  the	  semantics	  predicted	  truth-­‐values	  incompatible	  with	  the	  safety-­‐theoretic	  
account,	  that	  would	  be	  a	  problem,	  but	  just	  appealing	  to	  merely	  epistemically	  possible	  
worlds	  forces	  no	  such	  incompatibility.	  The	  point	  can	  be	  restated	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  distinction	  
between	  semantics	  and	  metasemantics,	  where	  a	  metasemantic	  theory	  is	  supposed	  to	  
explain	  why	  a	  given	  semantic	  theory	  holds	  for	  the	  language	  of	  a	  given	  community	  at	  a	  given	  
time.	  The	  possible	  worlds	  of	  the	  safety-­‐theoretic	  considerations	  are	  the	  concern	  of	  the	  




Also	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  Δ	  operator	  and	  related	  
English	  words	  such	  as	  ‘indefinite’,	  ‘borderline’,	  and	  ‘vague’	  are	  all	  being	  used	  as	  theoretical	  
terms,	  and	  rightly	  so.	  Although	  their	  introduction	  by	  examples	  is	  good	  enough	  for	  initial	  
working	  purposes,	  some	  refinement	  is	  needed	  once	  they	  are	  used	  in	  formulating	  a	  positive	  
theory	  of	  vagueness.	  For	  when	  we	  encounter	  more	  complex	  cases	  than	  the	  usual	  sorites	  
series	  provide,	  especially	  cases	  where	  the	  semantic	  and	  worldly	  dimensions	  fail	  to	  be	  
independent,	  the	  initial	  paradigms	  give	  no	  clear	  guidance	  as	  to	  how	  those	  terms	  should	  
most	  fruitfully	  be	  applied	  for	  theoretical	  purposes.	  We	  see	  many	  apparent	  joints,	  and	  are	  
unsure	  where	  to	  cut.	  For	  any	  theory	  that	  uses	  an	  operator	  like	  Δ	  to	  characterize	  vagueness-­‐
related	  phenomena,	  choosing	  a	  semantics	  for	  Δ	  is	  a	  prescriptive	  as	  well	  as	  a	  descriptive	  task.	  
It	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  deciding	  what	  it	  is	  best	  to	  mean	  by	  Δ.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  model-­‐theoretic	  
nature	  of	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri’s	  semantics	  strikes	  a	  helpful	  balance	  between	  informativeness	  and	  
flexibility.	  It	  is	  primarily	  designed	  to	  generate	  a	  good	  logic	  for	  Δ,	  especially	  as	  it	  interacts	  
with	  the	  modal	  operators.	  It	  validates	  nice	  structural	  principles	  for	  Δ,	  in	  particular	  those	  
corresponding	  to	  the	  modal	  system	  T,	  thereby	  imposing	  constructive	  discipline	  on	  our	  use	  of	  
Δ.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  does	  not	  specify	  in	  any	  detail	  an	  intended	  model	  (or	  even	  frame)	  for	  
the	  model	  theory.	  It	  thereby	  leaves	  considerable	  scope	  for	  fine-­‐tuning	  the	  specific	  
application	  of	  Δ	  in	  line	  with	  future	  metasemantic	  developments.	  
Like	  most	  accounts	  of	  vagueness,	  the	  epistemicist	  account	  in	  my	  book	  focusses	  on	  
simple	  borderline	  cases,	  and	  does	  not	  provide	  clear	  guidance	  on	  how	  to	  apply	  an	  operator	  
like	  Δ	  to	  more	  complex	  cases,	  especially	  those	  where	  the	  semantic	  and	  worldly	  dimensions	  
are	  not	  independent.	  As	  already	  noted,	  that	  does	  not	  make	  it	  irrelevant	  to	  such	  cases.	  
Science	  is	  full	  of	  cases	  where	  we	  know	  how	  to	  apply	  a	  theory	  to	  simple	  examples	  of	  a	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phenomenon	  but	  not	  to	  more	  complex	  examples.	  Typically,	  progress	  is	  then	  incremental,	  as	  
models	  (in	  the	  scientific	  sense,	  not	  the	  semantic	  one)	  are	  developed	  to	  permit	  the	  theory	  to	  
be	  applied	  to	  more	  complex	  examples,	  though	  never	  all	  at	  once,	  and	  always	  under	  
simplifying	  assumptions.	  I	  see	  no	  reason	  why	  such	  progress	  should	  not	  also	  be	  made	  in	  the	  
theory	  of	  vagueness,	  if	  philosophers	  are	  willing	  to	  do	  the	  hard	  work	  of	  model-­‐building.	  	  	  
	  
	  
3. Semantic	  Plasticity	  
	  
Where	  do	  these	  general	  methodological	  considerations	  leave	  Semantic	  Plasticity?	  In	  section	  
5,	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri	  argues	  directly	  against	  a	  version	  of	  it	  that	  appeals	  to	  metaphysical	  possibilities.	  
He	  formulates	  the	  version	  thus:	  
(*)	   Whenever	  φ	  is	  true	  and	  borderline,	  there	  is	  a	  close	  metaphysically	  possible	  world	  in	  
which	  φ	  expresses	  a	  proposition	  other	  than	  the	  proposition	  φ	  actually	  expresses,	  
and	  in	  which	  that	  proposition	  is	  false.	  
As	  a	  counterexample	  to	  (*),	  he	  discusses	  the	  case	  where	  φ	  is	  the	  material	  conditional	  #	  →	  χ,	  
χ	  is	  an	  actually	  true	  borderline	  sentence,	  and	  #	  is	  a	  relevantly	  precise	  actually	  non-­‐
borderline	  specification	  of	  the	  actual	  use	  facts	  that	  determine	  which	  proposition	  χ	  actually	  
expresses	  (so	  #	  is	  actually	  true).	  Thus	  Δ#	  and	  ¬Δχ	  are	  true,	  so	  ¬Δ(#	  →	  χ)	  is	  also	  true	  by	  the	  
normal	  logic	  of	  Δ.	  Therefore,	  since	  #	  →	  χ	  is	  true,	  it	  is	  also	  borderline.	  Thus,	  given	  (*),	  it	  
follows	  that	  there	  is	  a	  close	  metaphysically	  possible	  world	  w*	  in	  which	  #	  →	  χ	  expresses	  a	  
proposition	  other	  than	  the	  proposition	  #	  →	  χ	  actually	  expresses,	  and	  in	  which	  that	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proposition	  is	  false.	  We	  may	  assume	  that	  in	  all	  close	  metaphysically	  possible	  worlds	  #	  and	  →	  
express	  what	  they	  actually	  express.	  Thus	  if	  #	  is	  true	  in	  w*,	  the	  actual	  use	  facts	  that	  
determine	  which	  proposition	  χ	  expresses	  are	  the	  same	  in	  w*	  as	  in	  the	  actual	  world,	  so	  #	  →	  χ	  
expresses	  the	  same	  proposition	  as	  it	  actually	  expresses,	  contrary	  to	  hypothesis.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  if	  #	  is	  not	  true	  in	  w*,	  it	  is	  false	  in	  w*	  (given	  epistemicism,	  bivalence	  holds),	  so	  
#	  →	  χ	  is	  true	  in	  w*	  by	  the	  truth-­‐table	  for	  →,	  again	  contrary	  to	  hypothesis.	  Thus	  #	  →	  χ	  is	  a	  
counterexample	  to	  (*).	  This	  argument	  against	  (*)	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri’s	  formal	  
semantics,	  although	  it	  does	  use	  the	  standard	  assumption	  that	  the	  logic	  of	  Δ	  is	  like	  that	  of	  □	  
in	  a	  normal	  modal	  logic,	  which	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri’s	  semantics	  validates	  and	  I	  happily	  grant.	  
	   I	  will	  not	  defend	  (*).	  However,	  the	  falsity	  of	  (*)	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  more	  general	  
phenomenon	  of	  semantic	  plasticity	  as	  described	  in	  my	  book	  plays	  no	  role	  in	  explaining	  the	  
borderline	  status	  of	  #	  →	  χ,	  even	  when	  semantic	  plasticity	  is	  understood,	  as	  here,	  to	  be	  
variation	  in	  what	  is	  expressed	  in	  close,	  so	  metaphysically	  possible,	  worlds	  (epistemically	  
possible	  but	  metaphysically	  impossible	  worlds	  do	  not	  count).	  For	  the	  normal	  logic	  of	  Δ	  has	  
these	  theorems,	  which	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri’s	  semantics	  also	  validates:	  
	   	   Δ#	  →	  	  (Δ(#	  →	  χ)	  ↔	  Δχ)	  
	   	   Δ#	  →	  	  (Δ¬(#	  →	  χ)	  ↔	  Δ¬χ)	  
	   	   Δ#	  →	  	  ((¬Δ(#	  →	  χ)	  &	  ¬Δ¬(#	  →	  χ))	  ↔	  (¬Δχ	  &	  ¬Δ¬χ)	  
In	  brief,	  given	  that	  #	  is	  definite,	  the	  question	  whether	  #	  →	  χ	  is	  borderline	  reduces	  to	  the	  
question	  whether	  χ	  is	  borderline.	  We	  can	  explain	  the	  definiteness	  of	  #	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  truth	  
and	  lack	  of	  semantic	  plasticity,	  both	  of	  which	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri	  stipulates.	  Thus,	  if	  we	  can	  explain	  
the	  borderline	  status	  of	  χ	  in	  terms	  of	  semantic	  plasticity,	  then	  we	  can	  also	  explain	  the	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borderline	  status	  of	  #	  →	  χ	  indirectly	  in	  terms	  of	  semantic	  plasticity,	  using	  our	  explanations	  
of	  the	  definiteness	  of	  #	  and	  the	  borderline	  status	  of	  χ	  in	  those	  terms.	  For	  instance,	  if	  χ	  is	  a	  
semantically	  simple	  sentence,	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  its	  borderline	  status	  directly	  in	  
terms	  of	  its	  semantic	  plasticity,	  along	  the	  lines	  I	  originally	  proposed,	  for	  all	  that	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri’s	  
arguments	  show.	  Of	  course,	  χ	  may	  itself	  be	  complex,	  and	  present	  similar	  difficulties	  to	  those	  
#	  →	  χ	  did,	  but	  then	  we	  can	  apply	  the	  same	  strategy	  to	  χ	  as	  we	  did	  to	  #	  →	  χ,	  and	  so	  on	  down	  
in	  a	  recursive	  process	  terminating	  at	  the	  latest	  in	  semantically	  simple	  constituents.	  	  
An	  encouraging	  observation	  is	  that	  both	  the	  normal	  logic	  of	  Δ	  and	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri’s	  
semantics	  yield	  the	  principle	  that	  any	  truth-­‐function	  of	  non-­‐borderline	  sentences	  is	  itself	  
non-­‐borderline.	  For	  instance:	  
	   	   (Δφ	  ∨ 	  Δ¬φ)	  →	  (Δ¬φ	  ∨ 	  Δ¬¬φ)	  
	   	   ((Δφ	  ∨ 	  Δ¬φ)	  &	  (Δψ	  ∨ 	  Δ¬ψ)	  →	  (Δ(φ	  &	  ψ)	  ∨ 	  Δ¬(φ	  &	  ψ))	  
The	  negation	  of	  a	  non-­‐borderline	  sentence	  is	  itself	  non-­‐borderline,	  a	  conjunction	  of	  non-­‐
borderline	  conjuncts	  is	  itself	  non-­‐borderline,	  and	  so	  on.	  Contrapositively,	  if	  some	  truth-­‐
function	  θ	  of	  the	  simple	  sentences	  φ1,	  φ2,	  …,	  φn	  is	  borderline,	  then	  at	  least	  one	  of	  φ1,	  φ2,	  …,	  
φn	  is	  borderline	  too.	  Thus	  if	  the	  explanation	  of	  borderline	  status	  in	  terms	  of	  semantic	  
plasticity	  works	  for	  simple	  sentences,	  there	  is	  some	  hope	  of	  explaining	  θ’s	  borderline	  status	  
indirectly	  in	  terms	  of	  semantic	  plasticity	  through	  the	  contributions	  of	  its	  simple	  constituents.	  
One	  will	  not	  always	  be	  able	  to	  deduce	  θ’s	  borderline	  status	  from	  the	  borderline	  status	  of	  its	  
constituents,	  for	  not	  every	  truth-­‐function	  of	  borderline	  sentences	  is	  itself	  borderline:	  for	  
instance,	  φ	  &	  ¬φ	  is	  a	  non-­‐borderline	  truth-­‐function	  of	  φ,	  even	  when	  φ	  is	  borderline.	  
Nevertheless,	  if	  θ	  is	  borderline,	  a	  reasonable	  goal	  is	  to	  explain	  its	  borderline	  status	  in	  terms	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of	  the	  interrelated	  ways	  in	  which	  its	  constituents	  are	  borderline,	  where	  those	  ways	  
essentially	  involve	  semantic	  plasticity.	  
	   More	  generally,	  suppose	  that	  only	  semantically	  plastic	  sentences	  are	  borderline;	  Yli-­‐
Vakkuri’s	  arguments	  in	  no	  way	  undermine	  that	  principle.	  Let	  σ	  be	  a	  complex	  sentence	  with	  a	  
compositionally	  determined	  meaning.	  Thus	  if	  all	  the	  simple	  constituents	  and	  modes	  of	  
combination	  from	  which	  σ	  is	  composed	  are	  semantically	  non-­‐plastic,	  so	  is	  σ	  itself;	  by	  
hypothesis,	  then,	  σ	  is	  non-­‐borderline.	  Contrapositively,	  if	  σ	  is	  borderline,	  then	  some	  of	  its	  
simple	  constituents	  or	  modes	  of	  combination	  are	  semantically	  plastic.	  Thus	  we	  can	  hope	  to	  
explain	  σ’s	  borderline	  status	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  semantic	  plasticity	  of	  those	  simple	  constituents	  
or	  modes	  of	  combination.	  Although	  the	  present	  considerations	  do	  not	  guarantee	  success,	  
they	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  a	  reasonable	  strategy.	  
How	  does	  that	  strategy	  square	  with	  a	  safety	  conception	  of	  knowledge?	  For	  the	  truth	  
actually	  expressed	  by	  #	  →	  χ	  is	  not	  known,	  yet	  in	  every	  close	  metaphysically	  possible	  world	  
the	  sentence	  #	  →	  χ	  expresses	  a	  true	  proposition	  (by	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri’s	  argument).	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  
quite	  compatible	  with	  the	  previous	  assumptions	  that	  the	  proposition	  actually	  expressed	  by	  
#	  →	  χ	  is	  both	  actually	  believed	  and	  true	  in	  every	  close	  metaphysically	  possible	  world.	  
Invoking	  epistemically	  but	  not	  metaphysically	  close	  worlds	  looks	  like	  abandoning	  the	  safety	  
conception.	  If	  #	  →	  χ	  simply	  refutes	  that	  conception,	  then	  the	  original	  explanation	  of	  our	  
ignorance	  in	  terms	  of	  semantic	  plasticity	  fails	  even	  for	  the	  simplest	  borderline	  cases,	  
because	  it	  depends	  on	  a	  false	  epistemology.	  
At	  this	  point,	  it	  helps	  to	  recall	  how	  safety-­‐theoretic	  considerations	  would	  explain	  the	  
failure	  of	  irrational	  but	  true	  mathematical	  beliefs	  to	  constitute	  knowledge.	  Someone	  
irrationally	  plumps	  for	  believing	  a	  proposition	  p	  expressed	  by	  a	  precise	  mathematical	  
18	  
	  
sentence	  π.	  In	  fact,	  p	  is	  true,	  and	  so	  necessarily	  true.	  Thus	  in	  every	  close	  world,	  π	  expresses	  
p	  (π	  is	  not	  semantically	  plastic)	  and	  p	  is	  true.	  However,	  in	  some	  close	  world	  w,	  he	  irrationally	  
plumps	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  for	  believing	  a	  different	  proposition	  r	  expressed	  by	  a	  different	  
precise	  mathematical	  sentence	  ρ.	  But	  r	  is	  false,	  and	  so	  necessarily	  false.	  The	  sentences	  π	  
and	  ρ	  are	  not	  semantically	  indiscriminable	  to	  the	  subject;	  he	  understands	  both	  and	  is	  aware	  
of	  their	  semantic	  difference.	  It	  is	  just	  that	  his	  plumping	  does	  not	  track	  their	  difference	  in	  
truth	  value.	  Since	  his	  irrational	  false	  belief	  in	  the	  close	  world	  w	  is	  relevantly	  similar	  in	  
method	  to	  his	  irrational	  true	  belief	  in	  the	  actual	  world,	  the	  latter	  fails	  to	  constitute	  
knowledge.	  
Now	  consider	  Yli-­‐Vakkuri’s	  case.	  We	  may	  assume	  that	  the	  borderline	  true	  sentence	  χ	  
is	  semantically	  plastic	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  (*),	  for	  otherwise	  his	  argument	  against	  (*)	  would	  
assume	  more	  than	  it	  was	  entitled	  to	  by	  resting	  on	  stipulations	  hostile	  to	  (*).	  We	  may	  also	  
assume	  that	  the	  subject	  actually	  believes	  the	  proposition	  expressed	  by	  the	  sentence	  #	  →	  χ,	  
for	  the	  challenge	  is	  to	  explain	  in	  appropriate	  terms	  why	  such	  a	  belief	  does	  not	  constitute	  
knowledge.	  But	  then	  we	  should	  expect	  that	  in	  some	  close	  metaphysically	  possible	  world	  x,	  
the	  subject	  believes	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  the	  proposition	  expressed	  in	  x	  by	  the	  sentence	  #x	  →	  χ,	  
where	  #x	  is	  a	  relevantly	  precise	  non-­‐borderline	  specification	  of	  the	  use	  facts	  in	  x	  that	  
determine	  which	  proposition	  χ	  expresses	  in	  x	  (so	  #x	  is	  true	  in	  x),	  while	  by	  semantic	  plasticity	  
the	  proposition	  χ	  expresses	  in	  x	  differs	  from	  the	  one	  it	  actually	  expresses	  and	  is	  false	  in	  x,	  
even	  though	  x	  is	  just	  like	  the	  actual	  world	  in	  the	  worldly	  ways	  relevant	  to	  χ,	  though	  not	  in	  
those	  relevant	  to	  #	  and	  #x.	  For	  we	  were	  not	  supposed	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  actual	  world	  was	  
uniquely	  special	  in	  the	  subject’s	  believing	  the	  proposition	  expressed	  by	  the	  material	  
conditional	  with	  a	  true	  relevantly	  precise	  non-­‐borderline	  specification	  of	  the	  use	  facts	  that	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determine	  which	  proposition	  χ	  expresses	  as	  the	  antecedent	  and	  χ	  as	  the	  consequent.	  But	  
then	  #x	  →	  χ	  expresses	  a	  false	  proposition	  in	  x,	  for	  there	  #x	  expresses	  a	  truth	  and	  χ	  expresses	  
a	  falsehood.	  The	  false	  belief	  in	  the	  close	  world	  x	  in	  the	  proposition	  there	  expressed	  by	  
#x	  →	  χ	  is	  relevantly	  similar	  in	  method	  to	  the	  true	  belief	  in	  the	  actual	  world	  in	  the	  proposition	  
actually	  expressed	  by	  #	  →	  χ,	  so	  the	  latter	  fails	  to	  constitute	  knowledge.	  Thus	  we	  can	  explain	  
in	  safety-­‐theoretic	  terms	  the	  obstacle	  to	  knowing	  the	  truth	  expressed	  by	  #	  →	  χ,	  and	  so	  the	  
borderline	  status	  of	  #	  →	  χ.	  The	  explanation	  crucially	  invokes	  semantic	  plasticity	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	  vague	  consequent	  and	  a	  different	  safety-­‐theoretic	  consideration	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
precise	  antecedent.	  That	  is	  a	  natural	  generalization	  of	  the	  original	  explanation	  by	  appeal	  to	  
semantic	  plasticity	  of	  the	  obstacle	  to	  knowing	  the	  truth	  expressed	  by	  a	  simple	  vague	  
sentence.	  The	  hybrid	  aspect	  of	  the	  explanans	  follows	  the	  hybrid	  aspect	  of	  the	  explanandum,	  
where	  the	  sentence	  at	  issue	  combines	  the	  relevantly	  vague	  constituent	  χ	  with	  the	  relevantly	  
precise	  constituents	  #	  and	  →	  .	  
The	  previous	  paragraph	  made	  various	  simplifying	  assumptions.	  We	  can	  construct	  
more	  complicated	  scenarios.	  For	  instance,	  we	  can	  imagine	  subjects	  hard-­‐wired	  to	  believe	  
propositions	  expressed	  by	  the	  sentence	  #	  →	  χ	  but	  not	  those	  expressed	  by	  similar	  sentences	  
#x	  →	  χ	  in	  any	  close	  world.	  On	  a	  suitable	  development	  of	  the	  story,	  the	  true	  beliefs	  expressed	  
by	  #	  →	  χ	  of	  such	  bizarre	  creatures	  may	  bizarrely	  constitute	  knowledge.4	  If	  so,	  and	  they	  also	  
somehow	  know	  the	  truth	  expressed	  by	  the	  precise	  but	  massively	  detailed	  specification	  #,	  
may	  they	  not	  also	  know	  the	  truth	  expressed	  by	  χ	  inferentially,	  by	  modus	  ponens?	  But	  then	  χ	  
is	  presumably	  not	  borderline	  for	  them.	  That	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  is	  not	  borderline	  for	  us:	  
our	  use	  of	  χ	  is	  different	  from	  theirs,	  even	  if	  we	  do	  in	  fact	  express	  the	  same	  proposition.	  If	  #	  
correctly	  describes	  their	  use,	  then	  it	  does	  not	  correctly	  describe	  ours.	  If	  we	  enter	  into	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communication	  with	  them,	  it	  may	  be	  unclear	  to	  us	  whether	  χ	  as	  they	  use	  it	  expresses	  the	  
same	  proposition	  as	  χ	  as	  we	  use	  it.	  
The	  foregoing	  line	  of	  thought	  opens	  up	  many	  complex	  questions	  that	  I	  cannot	  hope	  
to	  deal	  with	  adequately	  here.	  Rich	  explanatory	  resources	  are	  available	  to	  an	  epistemicist	  
approach	  to	  vagueness	  articulated	  in	  terms	  of	  safety	  and	  semantic	  plasticity,	  given	  a	  
willingness	  to	  apply	  those	  resources	  to	  complex	  cases	  in	  correspondingly	  complex	  ways,	  in	  
the	  spirit	  of	  scientific	  model-­‐building.	  
	  






1	   For	  the	  sake	  of	  brevity,	  when	  I	  speak	  of	  knowing	  or	  believing	  a	  proposition	  expressed	  
by	  a	  sentence,	  I	  will	  mean	  that	  it	  is	  known	  or	  believed	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  that	  sentence.	  
Thus	  one	  may	  know	  or	  believe	  it	  expressed	  by	  one	  sentence	  (say,	  ‘Hesperus	  is	  Hesperus’)	  
but	  not	  expressed	  by	  another	  sentence	  (say,	  ‘Hesperus	  is	  Phosphorus’).	  
2	   The	  analogy	  may	  suggest	  a	  treatment	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  Fine	  (2007).	  This	  is	  no	  place	  
to	  discuss	  such	  a	  radical	  departure	  from	  the	  usual	  form	  of	  compositional	  semantics;	  Yli-­‐
Vakkuri	  follows	  the	  latter.	  
3	   The	  technical	  aspects	  of	  the	  logic	  were	  developed	  in	  collaboration	  with	  Jon	  Litland	  
(Yli-­‐Vakkuri	  and	  Litland	  2016).	  
4	   See	  Williamson	  2016	  for	  an	  analogous	  possibility	  concerning	  knowledge	  of	  
mathematical	  axioms.	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